Space Armament Governance

Final term paper I authored for Global Governance at the Harvard Kennedy School analyzing the laws (and lack thereof) surrounding the use of weapons in outer space. I provide specific public policy recommendations to better govern this nascent, but growing, frontier.

Conclusion

[…] are existing treaties and norms sufficient to govern space armament? Although the Outer Space Treaty is explicit about banning weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it is not so clear about alternative space weaponry such as kinetic orbital strikes or particle beams of destructive force. The United States, Russia, and China have all expanded their capacity for space defense, with India being the latest entrant when its anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) targeted a live test satellite in 2019. The United States has opposed limits on space armament, as illustrated with the PAROS resolution and its Space Power doctrine, while allies with their own space programs including the European Union, Japan, Saudi Arabia have yet to sign onto the Moon Treaty banning all weapons. Past attempts have made clear that banning space weapons altogether is ineffective. After all, the use of force on Earth is allowed – with just cause and limitations – so it should follow that similar law apply in celestial jurisdiction. Meanwhile, private multinational corporations continue to encroach into space by increasing defense lobbying spending and netting multimillion dollar contracts for military space programs.

The Outer Space Treaty is an outdated framework that is more dangerously ambiguous than constructive. An amended resolution permitting space armament with clear limitations, but not prohibition, would result in the support of the world’s largest space powers while also protecting the interests of sovereignties, peace, and rule of law in space.

Access Paper: https://mggscm.com/s/Space-Armament-Governance.pdf